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SANS NOM 
 
In 1976 Emmanuel Lévinas published Noms propres, a short collection of essays devoted 
to individual philosophers and writers, including Buber, Celan, Derrida and Proust.  In Noms 
propres, there are fifteen essays each with a proper name in the title, but there is also a 
sixteenth and final essay in this book of meetings and duels, which is entitled ‘Nameless’ 
(Sans nom).  It is with those who do not choose to be without name that Lévinas ends his 
work. 1  He is concerned with the end of the war and with a war without end, and the 
countless, nameless victims.  He writes ‘Since the end of the war, bloodshed has not ceased.  
Racism, imperialism and exploitation remain ruthless.  Nations and individuals expose one 
another to hatred and contempt, fearing destitution and destruction’. 2  ‘Sans nom’ confronts 
us with anonymity as catastrophe, as deprivation, as the loss of the singularity of the name, of 
names upon names erased without end. 3 
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There is an echo of this injunction without rest to resist and to protest against the worst 
anonymity, the state’s violent imposition of namelessness, in Derrida’s 1996 intervention in 
support of the sans-papiers, the undocumented aliens in France, ‘Dereliction of the Right to 
Justice (But what are the “sans-papiers” lacking?)’.  Derrida was responding to the 
introduction of a law in France to permit ‘the prosecution, and even the imprisonment, of 
those who take in and help foreigners whose status is held to be illegal’.  Any hospitality 
towards the sans-papiers is a crime, a breaking of the law. 4  What, Derrida asks are these so-
called sans-papiers lacking?  The without (sans) of anonymity has been claimed by the state 
and ostensibly put to work: sans papers, these foreigners are without rights and, ultimately, 
without the rights of human dignity. 5  For Derrida, this prompts a question: ‘one must ask 
oneself what happens to society when it ascribes the source of all its ills … to the “without” 
of others’. 6 
In supporting the sans-papiers, Derrida reiterates that this does not mean a speaking ‘for 
them’.  Those whom the state has defined as sans-papiers, as sans nom, as being without a 
name that has been recognised and processed by the state, ‘have spoken’: ‘They have spoken 
and they speak for themselves, we hear them, along with their representatives or advocates, 
their poets, and their songsters’. 7  The anonymous, those without a state-name, those who 
have had the anonymity of an unrecorded and unrecordable name imposed upon them, are 
speaking.  But how does one hear, or how does one stop hearing the nameless speak, the 
political and philosophical reverberation of the without name? 
 
WAR WITHOUT NAME  
 
War tells us nothing.  War has nothing to say, nothing at least that philosophy could make 
into a concept, which it could harness to an epistēmē.  As Clausewitz’s unfinished work On 
War suggests, with its five accidental prefaces on ‘a collection of materials’ that cannot be 
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collected into ‘a theory of war’, writing on war would interminable.  Both Foucault and 
Deleuze and Guattari position their writing on war in opposition to Clausewitz’s famous 
saying that ‘war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means’.  Clausewitz 
informs his reader at the start of his treatise that ‘if this [dictum] is firmly kept in mind 
throughout it will greatly facilitate the study of the subject and the whole will be easier to 
analyze’.  In other words, if we read Clausewitz as he wished to be read we would take this 
dictum as our guiding thread, not least because it should make the whole easier to analyze 
and allow us, as he says, to ‘fill in various gaps, large and small’ in the work. 
In ‘Psychoanalysis Searches the States of its Soul’ (2000), Derrida suggested that to think 
about war in our times, we must read Freud again.  He writes: 
 
If there is still war, and for a long time yet, or in any case war’s cruelty, warlike, 
torturing, massively or subtlety cruel aggression, it is no longer certain that the 
figure of war, and especially the difference between individual wars, civil wars, 
and national wars, still corresponds to concepts whose rigor is assured.  A new 
discourse on war is necessary.  We await today new “Thoughts for the Times on 
War and Death” … and a new “Why War?” … or at least new readings of texts of 
this sort. 8 
 
Writing in 2000, before the start of the so-called wars of and on terror, Derrida argued that 
today the ‘figure’ of war may no longer correspond to the assurance of a rigorous concept.  
Today, it is unlikely that we can still follow Clausewitz’s already tortured attempts to assert 
that ‘war is nothing but …’.  Today, there is a good chance that la figure de la guerre, the 
picture, the illustration, the representation or diagram of war will not match the concept (the 
signified even) of war.  What sounds and images (signifiers) would there then be for a new 
discourse or reading of war that exceeds or remains disproportionate to its concept? 
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In Vanity Fair (1847-1848), Thackeray makes a remarkable and important statement: in 
the midst of the events leading up to the battle of Waterloo, he writes: ‘We do not claim to 
rank among the military novelists.  Our place is with the non-combatants’. 9  Thackeray 
suggests that the place and the work of literature ‘is with the non-combatants’, and one can 
trace this distinguished literary tradition to Primo Levi and beyond.  Freud takes a similar 
position in ‘Thoughts for the Times on War and Death’.  While he uses the concept of war to 
uncover a deception or illusion that can only reveal psychoanalysis as the truth, Freud also 
argues that the war of the ‘non-combatants’, war from afar, is already set at a distance from 
war itself, from the concept of war.  This other of war, this war at home, is a state-run 
deception that can only reveal another deception.  The state not only encourages ‘the practice 
of lying and deception’ in its citizens, but it also deceives them, and leaves ‘the citizen of the 
civilized world … helpless in a world that has grown strange’.  But Freud also turns to the 
question of literature as a non-state run deception that reveals another deception.  In times of 
war-from-afar, as the other of war, when death is everywhere and nowhere, and we cannot 
‘imagine our own death’, we are drawn, we are pulled towards literature, where death still 
has a chance. 
In the presumption of narrative, of representation, of naming all its animals and all its 
objects, literature does not necessarily tell us what war cannot tell us.  For Derrida, the récits 
of Blanchot hover in the vicinities of not what war can tell us, can teach us, but in what war 
leaves us with, with what remains and remains to come of war: the sans nom, which Lévinas 
argued ends all works on the proper name. 10  The silent resonance of the sans in Blanchot’s 
récits, of the name Blanchot, tears itself from all ‘filiation with the name’. 11  The sans is an 
affirmation, but an affirmation without redemption, a narrative that is always undone by what 
cannot be named, a narrative without name.  This is neither making use of a deprivation 
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without name, nor is it a celebration of a chosen anonymity.  One cannot avoid, Derrida 
writes, ‘the anonymity in the name’. 12 
One can see this unavoidable anonymity not only in works without name where the 
principal characters have no name or discernable marks of identity, but also in the great 
works of the nineteenth century that labour without rest to name everything, and perhaps 
most of all when it comes to war, to war and its other.  In War and Peace (1865-1869), the 
young Nikolai Rostov has his first experiences of war between the disastrous battles of Ulm 
and Austerlitz in 1805. 13  Tolstoy writes: 
 
The squadron in which Rostov served had just had time to mount its horses when 
it was halted facing the enemy.  Again, as on the Enns bridge, there was no one 
between the squadron and the enemy, and there lay between them, separating 
them, the same terrible line of the unknown and of fear, like the line separating 
the living from the dead.14 
 
At the command to charge, Rostov drives his horse Little Rook forward and crosses into ‘the 
middle the line that had seemed so terrible’.  Exhilarated at surviving this crossing, Rostov 
inadvertently gallops ahead of the rest of his squadron.  Out in front, beyond the line, 
Rostov’s horse is shot from under him, and the next moment he finds himself ‘alone in the 
middle of the field.  Instead of moving horses and hussar backs, he saw the immobile earth 
and stubble around him’. 15  These displacements – sudden proximity and insurmountable 
distance, crossing lines and closing gaps that end in solitude, silence and emptiness – register 
the strange spatial and temporal anonymity of war: ‘Where ours were, where the French were 
– he did not know.  There was no one around’. 16  
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Rostov can now no longer find ‘that line which had so sharply separated the two armies’, 
he no longer knows how to orientate himself in relation to the battle. 17  This disorientation 
becomes deadly when he fails to recognise that the enemy is running towards him: 
 
‘Well, here are some people,’ he thought joyfully, seeing several men running 
towards him.  ‘They’ll help me!’  In front of these people ran one in a strange 
shako and a blue greatcoat, dark, tanned, with a hooked nose … ‘What men are 
these?  Rostov kept thinking, not believing his eyes. ‘Can they be Frenchmen?  
He looked at the approaching Frenchmen and, though a moment before he had 
been galloping only in order to meet these Frenchmen and cut them to pieces, 
their closeness now seemed so terrible to him that he could not believe his eyes. 
‘Who are they?  Why are they running?  Can it be they’re running at me?  Can it 
be?  And why?  To kill me?  Me, whom everybody loves so?’  … The first 
Frenchman with the hooked nose came so close that the expression on his face 
could already be seen.  And the flushed alien physiognomy of this man who, 
lowered bayonet, holding his breath, was running lightly towards him, frightened 
Rostov.  He seized his pistol and, instead of firing it, threw it at the Frenchman, 
and ran for the bushes as fast as he could. 18 
 
What remains of war, the former soldier Tolstoy suggests, is an inexorable and disorientating 
gaining of anonymity.  In war, one not only loses one’s own bearings, crossing the line and 
running ahead of oneself, but one is also unable to recognise or to name the enemy.  In war, 
the enemy is without name. 
Seven years later in 1812, Rostov is once again in action and fighting the French.  Once 
again, he is rushing forward into battle: ‘With the feeling with which he raced to intercept a 
wolf, Rostov, giving his Don horse free rein, galloped to intercept the disordered lines of the 
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French dragoons’. 19  Catching a French officer, ‘Rostov, not knowing why himself, raised 
his sabre and struck the Frenchman with it’.  Tolstoy writes: 
 
The moment he did this, all Rostov’s animation suddenly vanished.  The officer 
fell, not so much from the stroke of the sword, which only cut his arm slightly 
above the elbow, as from the jolt to his horse and from fear.  Reining in his horse, 
Rostov sought his enemy with his eyes, to see whom he had vanquished.  The 
French dragoon officer was hopping on the ground with one foot, the other being 
caught in the stirrup.  Narrowing his eyes fearfully, as if expecting a new blow 
any second, he winced, glancing up at Rostov from below with an expression of 
terror.  His face, pale and mud-spattered, fair-haired, young, with a dimple on the 
chin and light blue eyes, was not at all for the battlefield, not an enemy’s face, but 
a most simple, homelike face.  Before Rostov decided what to do with him, the 
officer cried out: ‘Je me rends!”. 20 
 
While it has perhaps become a cliché today to see one’s brother or oneself in an enemy on the 
battlefield, Tolstoy suggests that war is a terrible ever-increasing proximity with anonymity, 
with the eyes, the face, and body of the other who has no name.  This anonymity is the only 
possibility for the state-run imperative to kill and, at the same time, it is this nameless other, 
this broken mirror, that announces the (im)possibility of a proximity without name, and the 
persistence of the ‘invisible line’ that cuts across the frail privilege of every state-given name. 
Tolstoy returns to this connection between anonymity and war in his account of Pierre’s 
experiences during the French occupation of Moscow.  As much as a reaction to witnessing 
the battle of Borodino and his wife’s announcement that she wants a divorce as concern for 
his own safety, when he his arrested by the French Pierre is unable to give his name.  As he is 
processed by the occupying army Pierre is officially designated ‘as celui qui n’avoue pas son 
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nom [he who does not divulge his name]’. 21  Named as the one-who-has-no-name by the new 
power of the state, when he believes that he has been sentenced to death, Pierre experiences 
the full force of the anonymity of the state-run imperative to kill: 
 
There was one thought in Pierre’s head all that time.  It was the thought of who, 
finally, had sentenced him to be executed.  It was not the people of the 
commission that had interrogated him: not one of them would or obviously could 
have done it. … Who was it, finally, who was executing, killing, depriving of life, 
him – Pierre – with all his memories, longings, hopes, thoughts?  Who was doing 
it?  And Pierre felt that it was no one. 22 
 
It is perhaps not fortuitous that Tolstoy goes on to link this terrible anonymity of the state 
to the anonymity of an animal, a dog, that belongs to no one and that has lost all marks of 
identity: its name, its breed and its colour.  Spared execution, Pierre has been imprisoned 
with other regular soldiers.  Tolstoy writes:  
 
On the sixth of October, early in the morning, Pierre stepped out of the shed and, 
on his way back, stopped by the door, playing with a long, purplish dog on short, 
bowed legs that were fidgeting around him.  This dog lived in their shed, 
spending the nights with Karataev, but occasionally went to town somewhere and 
came back again.  It had probably never belonged to anyone, and now, too, it was 
no one’s and had no name at all.  The French called it Azorm the storytelling 
soldier called it Femgalka, Karataev and the others sometimes called it Grey, 
sometimes Floppy.  Its not belonging to anyone, and the absence of a name and 
even of a breed, even of a definite colour, seemed not to bother the purplish dog 
in the least. 23 
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Later, Tolstoy makes this ‘purplish dog’, this animal without identity, the only possible 
witness to the murder of Karataev on the forced march of the Russian prisoners from 
Moscow.  Tolstoy writes: 
 
A dog began to howl behind, in the place where Karataev had been sitting.  
‘What a fool, what’s it howling about?’ thought Pierre. 
Like him, his soldier comrades, walking beside Pierre, did not turn to look at 
the place from which the shot had been heard and then the howling of the dog; 
but there was a stern look on all their faces. 24 
 
 
ANIMALNIMITY 
 
On 8 June 2004, Derrida delivered what would be his last conference paper in France, ‘Le 
souverain bien – ou l’Europe en mal de souveraineté’. 25  Tolstoy reiterates the connection 
between the animal and the anonymity of war in Nikolai Rostov’s struggle with both combat 
and his relation to the absolute anonymity of the sovereign.  For both Derrida and Tolstoy, it 
is the question of the wolf. 26  ‘With the feeling with which he raced to intercept a wolf’ 
Rostov pursues the French enemy at Borodino. 27  Tolstoy reiterates this link between war 
and hunting animals in his account of Rostov’s involvement in tracking down and killing a 
wolf in 1810.  ‘Austerlitz … vividly but fleetingly flashed in his imagination … “If only once 
in my life I could chase down a seasoned wolf, I’d ask for nothing more” he thought, 
straining his hearing and sight, looking to the left and then to the right, and listening to the 
smallest nuances in the sounds of the chase’. 28  What is striking in Tolstoy’s description of 
the hunt is that every hunting dog has a name while the wolf remains nameless: ‘each dog 
knew its master and its name’. 29   
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The loss of anonymity in the hunt is absolute: ‘Suddenly the wolf’s entire physiognomy 
changed; he shuddered at the sight of human eyes, which he had probably never seen before, 
directed at him, and turning his head slightly towards the hunter, stopped’. 30  When Rostov’s 
favourite dog, Karay, brings the wolf down, it is ‘the happiest moment of his life’. 31  Before 
he can stab the wolf, Rostov is persuaded to capture the wolf alive.  Tolstoy then tells us that 
the dogs had killed five of the wolf’s cubs.  With a ‘stake thrust between her jaws’ and her 
legs bound the wolf is carried away: ‘everyone came to look at the wolf, who with her broad-
browed head hanging down and the bitten stick between her jaws, gazed with great glassy 
eyes at the crowd of dogs and the men surrounding her.  When they touched her she jerked 
her bound legs and looked wildly yet simply at them all.’ 32 
While Rostov has no scruples about the wolf’s terrible loss of anonymity, he is still unable 
to overcome the anonymity of his enemy in battle.  Derrida begins his 2004 paper by noting 
the sexual difference between ‘the beast’ and ‘the sovereign’, and one could add Tolstoy’s 
description of the capture of the she-wolf to the many instances of his problematic 
representation of women. 33  Examining the history of the political links between the 
development of concepts of sovereignty and the many fables and proverbs about wolves, 
Derrida concentrates on an idiomatic phrase in French, ‘à pas de loup’, which can be 
translated roughly as to act stealthily, furtively, silently. 34  For Derrida, this phrase links a 
historical use of the concept of the animal, of the wolf, to war, to the commander-in-chief of 
the army, to the sovereign. 
As Derrida points out, the concept “wolf” has long been ‘allegorising the hunt and war, 
the prey, predation’. 35  He takes great care to distinguish a ‘real wolf’ from the political 
concept of the wolf or she-wolf, warning that in speaking of an animal, we are not already 
speaking for the animal or assuming that the animal cannot speak for itself, in a language that 
we have yet to understand.  One can see an example of this easy idealisation or automatic 
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‘allegorising’ of the animal in War and Peace when Pierre dreams that he is ‘surrounded by 
dogs’ and writes in his journal, ‘suddenly one small dog seized my left thigh with its teeth 
and would not let go’.  Pierre immediately interprets these dogs as symbols of his own 
spiritual struggles: ‘Lord, Great Architect of nature!  help me to tear off the dogs – my 
passions’. 36  Derrida marks his own caution around the uses and abuses of the “wolf” by 
emphasising that the phrase ‘à pas de loup’ implies what has not yet been seen or heard.  In 
other words, in this bracketing Derrida insists that the “wolf” has not yet been named, and 
resists all the names that have been imposed on it.  He writes: 
 
If I have chosen the locution that names the ‘pas’ [step/not] of the wolf in ‘à pas 
de loup’, it is without doubt because the wolf itself is named in absentia, if one 
can say this.  The wolf is named where one neither sees nor hears it coming yet; 
where it is still absent, save his name.  It announces itself, one apprehends it, one 
names it, one refers to it, one even calls it by its name, one imagines it or one 
projects on it an image, a trope, a figure, a myth, a fable, a phantasm, but always 
by referring to someone who, stealthily advancing, is not there, not yet there, to 
someone who neither presents or represents itself yet. 37 
 
At stake in this stealthily slipping away from being named is not only a presentation or 
making present, a presumption of putting to use, but also a warning against treating this 
furtive absence as a resource, as ‘la ruse de guerre’, as an act of mastery or sovereignty. 38  
For Derrida, the “wolf” as a political concept has acted as both a critique of the tyranny and 
violence of an indivisible sovereignty and as a mirror that supports the claims of sovereignty 
to be – like the ‘wolf’ – outside of and above the law. 39 ‘The beast is the sovereign’, Derrida 
concludes, it is at once the possibility and the ruin of an absolute sovereignty. 40 
 12 
In War and Peace, Tolstoy appears both to reinforce and to undermine this traditional link 
between the “wolf”, war and sovereignty.  Wanting to find the logic or force to kill in battle, 
to fight for the sovereign, Rostov relies on his passion in hunting and killing the she-wolf.  
Rostov relies on the absolute anonymity of the she-wolf (redolent symbol, as Derrida says, of 
foundation and institution of Rome).  The violence of the beast, of what cannot be named or 
tamed, is the possibility of killing the enemy in war.  While Tolstoy does all he can to break 
away from this powerful trope of animal anonymity as the possibility of state sanctioned 
murder, not least by shattering the exceptional anonymity of the sovereign as Rostov sees the 
Tsar weeping under an apple tree at Austerlitz, he neither challenges this tradition of what we 
might call animalnimity, nor, despite his best intentions, diminishes the aura around the 
greatest sovereign of all, Napoleon.  In War and Peace, “Napoleon” remains the oldest of 
names for when ‘the beast becomes the sovereign who becomes the beast’. 41 
As Derrida had suggested in ‘The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)’ (1999), 
the animal has always been waiting to see how it will be addressed, asking of the human 
‘what is he going to call me?’ 42  This tradition of animalnimity, of relying on and exploiting 
the animal that can never be named and that is always being named in philosophy and 
literature, of the animal as a never ending loss of an inexhaustible anonymity, has always 
been political, always stood as a witness sans nom, for the most equivocal political events of 
our times, for the wars without end. 43   
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